The pullout from Debaltsevo was self-organized in secret from the General Staff and Sector "C" command, says Andrei Vysota, the commander of 25th territorial battalion. Additional information: Here is an overview of the strategic situation over the past half a year in and around Debaltsevo - in later part of this article link ] Here is an article on the internal squabbling within the nationalist forces regarding media coverage of the Debaltsevo events link ]Here is an article regarding rumored arrangements the commander of the 128th brigade made with the Donbass militias regarding safe passage, and why they fell apart link ] If you are wondering how is it possible that the nationalist army is in such deplorable condition and if this account is even true it does fully match what we know about pro-Kiev armed forces so far link to a report about the Donetsk airport fiasco from the adviser to the president of Ukraine ]. In a word, they have been in abysmal condition before the conflict started link to an excellent analysis on the subject ] . A nother problem is that competent and independently thinking military leadership would, first and foremost, be a threat to the crooked politicians and oligarchs controlling Ukraine, the newly promoted pro-Kiev officers are picked to be spineless and incompetent. This is further exacerbated by two factors: First, those that do make independent decisions generally face the court martial (this is why what commander of 128th did at Debaltsevo was brave - last guy who pulled out his hopelessly outmatched men is now facing 10 years in prison ). Second, ethnic Russians historically held army service in higher regard, and also the army is now formed via forced conscription, so at all levels there are plenty of separatist agents and sympathizers. Of course, enemy agents are also a problem for the Donbass militias, but as they are all-volunteer units they have far fewer unwilling and unmotivated members, and their leadership has no cause to fear competent military commanders as it more or less formed out of combat leaders (elected head of the DPR has just been shot through the leg while leading his men storming Debaltsevo; not the first time he was wounded, either). ---------------------------------- Finally, I'd like to explain why I'm publishing this item - which could, if noticed, lead to the nationalist army becoming somewhat more organized and competent: Although I do sympathize with the people of the Donbass defending their ancestral homes (any misguided posters still thinking these lands were ever part of historic Ukraine or that militiamen are all Putin clones are welcome to check out this ] and this ], for example), Ukrainian people or even the nationalist army itself are not the problem. My hope is that once everyone clearly sees that the Kiev government is working against the interests of everyone in Ukraine, the warring sides can unite against the usurpers and their puppetmasters. Dixi. ---------------------------------- Here is a transcript of the whole thing, may be useful to some of the audience: - Debalcevo salient defense was built to fail. This is my opinion - not only mine, but also of other officers we discussed this with. - There was no plan. That they declared this a "planned evacuation" is simply an excuse after the fact. This operation was carried out by a group of officers on site. General Staff didn't know about it, even Sector HQ didn't know about it. Because if General Staff knew and Sector HQ knew, the evacuation would fail. convoy evacuating the wounded ended up KIA almost entirely. Our saw four trucks packed to the brim with corpses. They couldn't do anything, trucks were burnt. So, since the incompetent operations planned by command led to deaths... If they knew - I'm 90% sure that if someone in the General Staff knew about this - everything would turn out differently . In three days here, I did not hear a single word from Sector HQ. So... The pullout plan - there, the commander of 128th was more or less in charge. Nobody in Sector HQ - I am absolutely sure, because of their cowardice or something, would not be able to give such an order. On multiple occasions, I hear the Sector commander reporting to the higher ups that we are doing great, everything is fine, we accomplished this, this and that... When I was standing right there and telling him - "You are lying, sir!". For that I was... What? Yes, that was Colonel Taran. There are many lives on his conscience... Redkodub, Nikishino - where my men were. We got ammo one time, but failed to evacuate the wounded - because at the moment not just major roads were cut, we were fully surrounded by then. We ourselves passed instructions to our units, what to do . Yes, artillery supported us. But, again, this was in secret from HQ or ATO command, we communicated with artillery unit commanders directly. The less HQ knows, the more successful operations are. Debalcevo salient like that. Even like that, really. From this side, it was almost undefended. The defense was engineered to fail. We were fully encircled: Village of Logvinovo, then Nizhnyaya Lozovaya, Sanzharovka, Hill 307.9 - those were fully controlled by the separatists. So this whole line was blocked. Roads here, here, here - were all blocked. The boys were retreating between separatist . Here is the Hill, here they also had firing positions. Our came inbetween. We were constantly hitting them with artillery there, so we could pass. For example - Logvinovo was taken on the 9th, at 3am. I don't know if General Staff knew about it, but vehicles were still being sent there for the next 12 hours* and getting shot up. Make your own conclusions here. These three roads were fully blocked by the 11th. Our headquarters were living in their own world, the troops were separate. That's it. That's what caused the whole situation. Our battalion did not abandon any positions without an order to do so. If stayed there till morning, we'd have 2500 men "missing in action" - because we would not be able to recover the bodies. The funny thing is, 25th battalion was the last to leave the positions and cross this line. Because the plan was to first move the armor, then infantry, then the rest in vehicles... And our guys ended up walking, walking, walking - the whole way. Yes, 25th battalion left Nikishino. But there was nothing left there to defend. I reported as far back as October that we need to clear Nikishino. That was necessary. This village, that said was under our control - we "controlled" two streets in there. This village is on the road between Faschevka and Kaushatskoe. Kaushatskoe is where training camps are. This is also something we reported way back in late fall Redkodub - we "controlled" two houses. Nikishino - we "controlled" two streets. And the General Staff was reporting everything in that area was under our control. We didn't control a damn thing. We were meeting here, on their armored vehicles, they were black like Africans. Like said - "damn dancing Africans", and in Artemovsk were busy getting medals. And soldiers were still running across the fields there. Other officer: I met a APC - "Who are you?" - "128th" "- What do you mean, 128th? Your commander is getting Hero of Ukraine already!" -"No one left behind, yeah right..." - No, the commander of the 128th did a lot. My gratitude to him for giving the order . He took the responsibility. What happened then, who got out and how - it's hard to judge here. We can not do it. That he took the responsibility - that was the right thing to do. Not one other colonel in there dared to. And he did. And he got us out. I'd say he deserves it, more or less. However they got out, whatever happened there - he took the responsibility . They probably gave him Hero of Ukraine so he doesn't talk. Trying to shut him up. That's all there is to it.



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Kiev officer on Debalcevo: HQ incompetence and self-organized breakout

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